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Cognitive Science, Moral Reasoning,  
and the Theological Suspicion of Ethics
Neil Messer
This essay explores some theological implications of cognitive-science re-
search into moral reasoning. Evolutionary theorizing argues that human mo-
rality originated as an adaptation that enabled our evolutionary ancestors to 
function as members of a social species. Neuroscientific experiments suggest 
that utilitarian responses to the moral dilemmas known as “trolley problems” 
involve more activity in brain areas associated with reason and less in areas 
associated with emotion than do nonutilitarian responses. According to Peter 
Singer and Joshua Greene, these two areas of research, taken together, sup-
port utilitarianism. They might therefore also seem to challenge nonutilitarian 
theological ethics. However, drawing on Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, it 
is argued instead that cognitive-science research on moral reasoning could of-
fer a valuable hermeneutic of suspicion concerning ethics as a (merely) human 
project. Christians can welcome this critical function as an aid in the theologi-
cal reconstruction of ethics without thereby being committed to the inferences 
drawn by Singer and Greene.
Recent decades have seen a buRgeoning of the cogni-
tive sciences: interdisciplinary scientific studies of human psychology, behavior, 
and culture, some of which appear to raise challenging questions for our self-
understanding as human creatures. one such area is the cognitive scientific 
study of ethics and morality, which covers a range of questions from the very 
practical to the highly theoretical.1 this essay focuses on a topic toward the 
theoretical end of the range (though, as we shall see, not without practical 
implications): the evolutionary and neuroscientific study of moral judgment. 
before that topic is introduced, a brief account of the relevant scientific ap-
proaches might be helpful.
evolutionary psychology treats human cognition and behavior as the prod-
ucts of interactions between our present environment and a psychology shaped 
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by the particular evolutionary history of our species. the term “evolutionary 
Psychology” is often used to denote a specific methodological approach to that 
enterprise and sometimes capitalized to distinguish this specific methodological 
paradigm from “evolutionary psychology” in the broader sense.2 evolutionary 
Psychology in this narrower sense makes various characteristic assumptions.3 
first, it assumes a computational theory of mind: the mind is understood as an 
information processing device that generates behavioral responses to inputs 
from the environment. second, the mind is thought to be modular. it is not 
a single, general-purpose, problem-solving device but a conglomeration of a 
great many algorithms or devices (referred to as “mental modules”) “designed” 
to solve specific problems: detecting when someone is cheating on an agree-
ment, identifying nutritious and nontoxic food, selecting a suitable mate, and 
so on. human minds are as powerful and flexible as they are because they are 
made up of large numbers of these modules, capable of acting in many different 
combinations. third, these mental modules are held to be adaptations to evolu-
tionary selection pressures operating in the evolutionary history of our species. 
this does not necessarily mean the behaviors they promote are adaptive now; 
in some cases they are not. for example, a liking for sweet and fatty foods might 
have been highly adaptive when energy-rich foods were scarce but might be 
distinctly nonadaptive in a modern urban environment with fast-food outlets 
everywhere. evolutionary Psychologists typically postulate an “environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness” in the Pleistocene (ca. 1.8 million–10,000 years 
ago), during which our ancestors lived as members of small hunter-gatherer 
bands. fourth, like physical organs, mental modules originating as evolutionary 
adaptations in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness are presumed to 
be universal in our species, across all cultures and societies.
all these assumptions have been challenged by other evolutionary theo-
rists, social scientists, and philosophers of biology, but this need not vitiate the 
project of “evolutionary psychology” in the broader sense of explaining aspects 
of cognition and behavior as products of human evolution. for example, evo-
lutionary theories of the origins of morality need not depend on the specific 
assumptions of evolutionary Psychologists in the narrower sense (though the 
latter can and do add their own specific contributions). What all this suggests 
for the purposes of this essay is that evolutionary psychology in the broad sense 
is a fruitful field of study that may generate insights with which theologians 
and ethicists would do well to engage. but any particular claim about human 
behavior or cognition should be treated with a certain caution because it may 
depend on assumptions or methods that others in the field would contest.
brain imaging is a relative newcomer to these areas of inquiry because imag-
ing technologies have only recently advanced far enough to enable studies of 
the neural correlates of complex mental states and activities.4 the main tech-
niques used are positron emission tomography (Pet), single photon emission 
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computed tomography (sPect), and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRi). in Pet and sPect, a radioactive tracer is injected into the blood 
and its distribution in the brain is measured by the scanner. in fMRi, the scan-
ner sets up a strong magnetic field around the subject’s brain. this field will 
be affected by the magnetic properties of the blood circulating around the 
brain; particularly active areas of the brain will have an increased blood flow, 
and this will be detectable by the scanner. typically researchers will compare 
participants’ brain activity while performing the mental activity being studied 
with their brain activity under “contrast” conditions, where participants might 
be allowed to think about whatever they wish or be given a mental task that is 
similar but not identical to the one being studied.
in a survey of neuroscientific studies of religion, uffe schjoedt notes various 
challenges that also apply to the neuroscientific studies of morality discussed 
below.5 first are problems with “ecological validity,” as neuroscientists call 
it: experimental conditions or design may distort participants’ mental activ-
ity or render it less authentic. for example, the strange experience of being 
immobilized inside a large, noisy piece of machinery in a hospital research 
facility may induce anxiety or make it difficult to concentrate on the set task. 
second, the raw data from imaging experiments require extensive processing 
and analysis to generate answers to the researchers’ questions, and this analysis 
depends critically on assumptions about brain structures and functions. third, 
the technical challenges often mean that only small cohorts of participants can 
be studied, and this can limit the statistical significance of the results. finally, 
the framing of research questions is no easy matter when one investigates these 
topics: researchers’ conceptual presuppositions or biases may generate distort-
ing or misleading questions.6
a pessimistic observer might wonder whether such challenges invalidate the 
whole enterprise of neuroscientific research on such complex and contested 
areas of human experience. schjoedt does not share this pessimism with respect 
to the neuroscience of religion. instead he regards these difficulties as reasons to 
design studies as carefully and rigorously as possible, treat the conclusions with 
caution, and be skeptical about overblown popular claims. something similar 
could be said of the neuroscientific studies of morality, to be discussed below.
The Evolution of Morality
ever since darwin published the Origin of Species, evolutionary biologists have 
been interested in explaining the origins of human morality, particularly the 
existence of altruism. biologists define altruism as behavior by one individual 
that improves others’ chances of survival and reproduction at the expense of 
its own. altruism in this sense is found not only in humans but in many other 
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species, including eusocial insects like ants, bees, and wasps. for example, in 
honey bees, the queen is the only female in the colony to reproduce; the others 
are all sterile workers whose role is to support the queen. by performing this 
role, they promote the queen’s reproductive success at the expense of their own. 
this was a long-standing evolutionary puzzle: in Origin, darwin acknowledged 
that it seemed to pose a nearly fatal objection to his theory of natural selec-
tion.7 the heart of his theory is that those traits that maximize the chances of 
survival and reproduction are more likely to be passed onto future generations, 
so behavioral traits that cause individuals to sacrifice their chances in favor of 
others might be expected to disappear from the population.
however, darwin also suggested the germ of an answer, developed by 
twentieth-century theorists into some elegant (if partial) solutions. first came 
William hamilton’s theory of “kin selection” or “inclusive fitness,” accord-
ing to which a “gene for” altruistic behavior could spread in the population if 
the beneficiaries were genetic kin of the altruists; in that case, self-sacrificing 
behavior on the part of some of its hosts could be the “altruism gene’s” most 
effective strategy for getting as many copies of itself as possible into the next 
generation.8 after kin selection came further work by theorists such as Robert 
trivers on “reciprocal altruism,” essentially a theorization supported by math-
ematical modeling of the folk wisdom that it helps both of us if you scratch my 
back and i scratch yours.9 these were the two theoretical solutions brilliantly 
popularized by Richard dawkins in The Selfish Gene.10
however, human beings display “genuine” (nonreciprocal, nonkin) altruism. 
can this be explained in evolutionary terms, and if so, how? as yet, there is 
no consensus but no shortage of proposals.11 one is that genuine altruism is a 
nonadaptive by-product of adaptive behaviors like kin selection and reciprocity: 
we have evolved brains that support the latter because they were adaptive for 
our evolutionary ancestors, but once that cognitive and moral machinery (so to 
say) has evolved, it produces altruistic behavior that extends far beyond kinship 
and reciprocity. other theorists prefer group-selectionist explanations: genuine 
altruism may reduce the reproductive success of the individuals who perform it 
but promote the overall reproductive success of a group in which it is found.12
it is worth noting two features of this discussion. first, it frames the cen-
tral problem as the existence of altruism. the neuroscientist and philosopher 
Joshua greene, for example, asserts that “the essence of morality is altruism, 
unselfishness, a willingness to pay a personal cost to benefit others.”13 not that 
the evolution of morality is only about altruism: there is no shortage of theories 
about the origins of justice, compassion, and other moral intuitions and emo-
tions.14 but altruism is placed the heart of the problem. thus, for greene, 
morality is an evolutionary adaptation that enabled our ancestors to deal with 
the tragedy of the commons or the tension between individual and collective 
self-interest, the problem of “Me vs. us.”15
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those who have learned anything from alasdair Macintyre over the past 
thirty years should have become sensitive enough to history to raise some criti-
cal questions about this. as Macintyre has shown, framing the central problem 
of morality as the problem of egoism versus altruism (“Me vs. us”) is a rather 
recent and particular development, a product of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century northern europe—and one that he maintains has serious weaknesses 
associated with it.16 if it is assumed that the tragedy of the commons, or how 
the members of a social species are to get along in groups, is the central problem 
that the moral sentiments have been “designed” by natural selection to solve, 
then there is a risk that this will prejudice the inquiry from the outset.
to slip the phrase “the moral sentiments” into the discussion hints at a sec-
ond noteworthy point. Quite frequently, discussions of evolution and ethics do 
not offer a careful account of what is meant by morality. it seems to be taken 
for granted that we all know what we mean by it. and what (it is assumed) we 
mean is a bundle of emotional predispositions concerned with compassion, 
justice, and the like. Readers who think they hear echoes of david hume, 
adam smith, and the moral sense theorists are not much mistaken. “darwin’s 
bulldog,” t. h. huxley, was philosophically indebted to those thinkers, and 
his own writing on evolution and ethics was concerned at least in part with 
theorizing the evolution of the “moral sentiments.”17 More recently the politi-
cal philosopher Larry arnhart has located darwin (and himself) in the same 
genealogy as hume and the moral sense theorists.18 and Joshua greene, too, 
shows hume’s influence in passages like the following: “Reason is the champion 
of the emotional underdog, enabling what hume called ‘calm passions’ to win 
out over ‘violent passions.’ Reasoning frees us from the tyranny of our immedi-
ate impulses by allowing us to serve values that are not automatically activated 
by what’s in front of us. and yet, at the same time, reason cannot produce good 
decisions without some kind of emotional input, however indirect.”19 this is 
not, of course, to suggest that just because hume or adam smith said some-
thing, it must be wrong. but theologians wishing to engage with the discussion 
about the evolutionary origins of morality would do well to remember its very 
particular intellectual history because that history might give rise to a framing 
of the questions that christians should not simply accept as given.
The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment
in the past fifteen years the evolutionary study of morality has been joined 
by neuroscientific research on moral judgment. Joshua greene has been at 
the heart of the latter since the early 2000s, when he and his co-workers con-
ducted a series of studies on the brain activity of people contemplating the 
moral thought experiments known as “trolley problems.”20 in his initial study, 
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participants were asked to consider scenarios of two different types. in an ex-
ample of the first, an approaching railway train is about to collide fatally with 
five people on the track; would it be right to save their lives by diverting the 
train onto a siding, knowing that another person on the track in the siding 
would be killed by it? in an example of the second, there is no siding but there 
is a large, heavy man (or in some versions a man wearing a heavy backpack) on a 
bridge crossing the track. Would it be morally right to stop the train by pushing 
the man off the bridge into its path, sacrificing his life to save the other five? 
the majority of respondents answer “Yes” to the first of these and “no” to the 
second. they think there is a moral difference between acting to save five lives, 
knowing that one’s action will have the unintended consequence that one other 
person will die, and deliberately, directly killing one person in order to save five. 
a minority say “Yes” to both—they see no morally relevant difference between 
the two. they are utilitarians (at least when answering these questions). they 
hold that the only relevant criterion in making these moral judgments is the 
outcome: the right action is always the one that results in the least harm and 
the greatest benefit. they do not think it morally relevant that in one case the 
benefit is achieved by committing what we would normally call murder.
greene and his co-workers asked their subjects to consider scenarios like 
these and measured their brain activity using fMRi. they found that sce-
narios involving direct, hands-on killing were associated with greater activ-
ity in brain areas involved in emotion. Moreover, the response times of the 
minority who made utilitarian judgments about the direct-killing scenarios 
were longer than the response times of the majority. greene and colleagues 
concluded that their subjects were emotionally predisposed to make nonutili-
tarian judgments (for example, that there is a moral difference between direct 
killing and acting in a way that will indirectly result in someone’s death). the 
utilitarian minority, they argued, were making reasoned judgments against 
that emotional inclination.
Implications for Ethical Theory
Peter singer has argued that, taken together, these two strands of research—
evolutionary and neuroscientific—indirectly support utilitarian ethics in the 
following way. utilitarianism notoriously generates conclusions that many 
people intuitively find repugnant, as in the trolley scenarios. a standard line 
of critique is that there must be something wrong with the theory if it gives 
these repugnant results; so the question is whether that intuitive sense of re-
pugnance can supply reliable moral insights. some approaches, such as John 
Rawls’s “reflective equilibrium,” would suggest that it can. the reflective equi-
librium approach treats moral intuitions as potentially valid sources of moral 
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insight, which might have to be modified in the light of our ethical theory, but 
might sometimes instead lead us to modify the theory.21 singer argues that 
such approaches are undermined by evolutionary and neuroscientific studies. 
these studies, he holds, show that our moral intuitions are contingent prod-
ucts of our particular evolutionary history. that history may predispose us to 
react more strongly to situations in which we are acting against someone else 
at close quarters (as in the second trolley scenario) just because those would 
have been the only kinds of situations our evolutionary ancestors would have 
encountered. they did not have the technology to cause actions at a distance, 
as in the first trolley scenario. but, according to singer, no moral significance 
is to be attached to “the fact that i have killed someone in a way that was pos-
sible a million years ago, rather than in a way that became possible only two 
hundred years ago.”22
one question that could be put to singer is whether he is correct to describe 
the first trolley scenario as “killing someone in a way that became possible 
only two hundred years ago,” or whether that description begs the question 
of whether there is a relevant moral difference between the two scenarios. to 
describe two different acts resulting in someone’s death as “killing” assumes 
that it makes no difference to their moral description whether the result was 
intended or unintended. but that is in effect what singer sets out to demon-
strate: his argument is that greene’s research supports utilitarianism (which 
denies that it makes a difference) against nonutilitarian claims that it does make 
a difference.
greene also finds support for utilitarianism in his results, but in a rather 
different way.23 using the analogy of a digital camera, he identifies two modes 
in our moral psychology: the quick “point-and-shoot” mode of our moral 
instincts and the slower “manual” mode of our moral reasoning. our moral 
instincts evolved to help us get along in our various “moral tribes”: to address 
the problem of “Me vs. us” or the tragedy of the commons that results from 
putting self-interest before the claims of the group. but the modern world 
offers “new pastures” on which a different problem arises: the encounter of 
many different moral tribes, each with different sets of group norms and the 
moral instincts to reinforce them. this creates a new tragedy, in which the 
incompatible commonsense moralities of the different tribes become a source 
of intractable conflict. Moral instincts will not resolve these conflicts because 
the commonsense morality of each group has a different set of moral instincts 
to support it, so we must turn to manual-mode moral reasoning. however, 
moral reasoning often serves to rationalize the answers supplied by our vari-
ous tribal moral instincts: greene regards rights-talk and Rawls’s theory of 
justice as well as the more venerable deontological theory of immanuel Kant 
as examples of such rationalizations. instead, we need a “metamorality,” a 
mode of moral reasoning that will transcend our tribe-specific instincts.24 
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according to greene, the metamorality we need is utilitarianism, which es-
chews the fruitless search for non-question-begging proofs of our instinctive 
moral judgments and gives us a method for settling our differences by means 
of empirically testable proposals about what will make life as good as possible 
for everyone.
even more than singer’s, greene’s neuroethical argument for utilitarianism 
is open to challenge at various points, some of which will be touched on later 
in the essay. for the present, however, we consider how a christian theological 
tradition might begin to engage with this discussion.
Theological Suspicion
Recall that schjoedt has drawn attention to several challenges for the neurosci-
entific study of religion: the difficulty of conceptualizing and framing research 
questions satisfactorily, the problem of ecological validity, and the possible dis-
torting effects of researchers’ presuppositions and biases in the interpretation 
of results, among others. the discussion of singer and greene in the previous 
section has already hinted at corresponding questions about the framing and 
interpretation of cognitive-science studies of morality, and one might add that 
concerns about ecological validity also resurface in relation to greene’s “trol-
leyology.”25 Just as there is a considerable difference between the experiences 
of being instructed to pray while immobilized in an fMRi scanner and praying 
in the company of one’s own church community in its collective worship, so 
there is a great gulf between performing far-fetched thought experiments in 
the scanner and the everyday living of an embodied, socially connected moral 
life.26 this concern about ecological validity might lead some to doubt whether 
brain imaging studies can ever yield results that have any meaningful connec-
tion to the moral life as it is lived. however, what schjoedt argues in relation 
to the neuroscience of religion can also be said of morality: the problems and 
challenges are reasons for caution, suspicion, and rigor, not for rejecting the 
project tout court. if greene’s trolleyology has conceptual and ecological prob-
lems, it may yet generate insights and questions that are serviceable, if handled 
with care; and if his research or its interpretation is flawed, that should prompt 
him or others to design better experiments, not to give up trying. the working 
assumption for the remainder of this essay is that, when done with proper rigor 
and interpreted with due caution, the cognitive scientific study of morality may 
yield genuine insights and questions. in which case, how should a christian 
theological ethic engage with those insights and respond to the questions?
in the fall narrative early in the book of genesis, the serpent promises the 
woman, “You will be like god, knowing good and evil” (gn 3:5). commenting 
on this passage, barth notoriously remarked, “What the serpent has in mind 
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is the establishment of ethics.27 in similar vein, one fragment of bonhoeffer’s 
Ethics begins:
the knowledge of good and evil appears to be the goal of all ethical reflection. 
the first task of christian ethics is to [overcome] that knowledge. this attack 
on the presuppositions of all other ethics is so unique that it is questionable 
whether it even makes sense to speak of a christian ethics at all. if it is never-
theless done, then this can only mean that christian ethics claims to articulate 
the origin of the whole ethical enterprise, and thus to be considered an ethic 
only as the critique of all ethics.28
here bonhoeffer is hinting at a different kind of narrative of the origins of 
ethics from the scientific origin narratives we have just been considering: a 
theological narrative of origins, of the sort he has earlier expounded more fully 
in Creation and Fall, his 1932–33 berlin lectures on genesis 1–3.29 this is not, 
of course, some kind of creationist refusal of the scientific narrative: bonhoeffer 
makes it clear in Creation and Fall and elsewhere that he has no interest in resist-
ing a darwinian understanding of biological evolution and the descent of the 
human species from animal ancestors (62, 76). it is more akin to barth’s read-
ing of the genesis texts as “sagas,” or narratives disclosing the divine origins of 
creation, that lie beyond the reach of our scientific investigations of history.30 
the theological narrative of origins is not a rival to scientific narratives but can 
perfectly well be read alongside the latter.
in Creation and Fall, bonhoeffer argues that god’s prohibition against eating 
from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (gn 2:17) is grace. the bound-
ary or limit that god sets makes possible adam’s creaturely freedom and his 
knowledge of god: “adam knows neither what good nor what evil is and lives 
in the strictest sense beyond good and evil; that is, adam lives out of the life that 
comes from god, before whom a life lived in good, just like a life lived in evil, 
would mean an unthinkable falling away” (86–87, emphasis original).31 the 
humans’ rebellion against god’s prohibition at the instigation of the serpent is 
their refusal of that creaturely limit (and therefore a refusal of their creature-
hood as such) in the attempt to become sicut deus, “like god.” it is a successful 
attempt. in that respect at least, the serpent is not wrong: “the fall really makes 
the creature—humankind in the imago dei—into a creator sicut deus,” writes 
bonhoeffer (116, emphasis original). but this is a radically alienating develop-
ment. the unity of knowing god as creator, “as the center and the boundary 
of human life” (87), is broken apart into the knowledge of good and evil (tob 
and ra). the refusal of the creaturely limit leaves no room in the human be-
ing’s universe for his or her creator, so when god says to adam, “where are 
you?” adam’s response is to run away and hide. as beings separated from god 
by the division of our knowledge into good and evil, we are also divided within 
ourselves; and this dividedness from ourselves and flight from our creator, 
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remarks bonhoeffer, “we call conscience” (118). the knowledge of tob and ra, 
he argues, also gives rise to shame and obsessive desire, alienating us from one 
another; and our refusal to live as human creatures alienates us from nature, 
from the “soil,” and from our work in the world.
this reading of the fall narrative underpins the profound theological sus-
picion of ethics-as-human-project, which bonhoeffer articulates in the Ethics 
when he writes that the first task of christian ethics is to overcome the knowl-
edge of good and evil. the merely human project of ethics is an aspect of fallen 
humanity’s effort to live out of our own resources, our own divided and dividing 
knowledge of good and evil. it is an aspect of the life that we are compelled to 
live, as bonhoeffer says, “between curse and promise” (135).
if this is how a christian theological tradition should understand the hu-
man project of ethics, those neuroethicists who claim to unmask aspects of 
that project might turn out to be friends, not enemies, of a christian under-
standing of ethics—perhaps despite themselves. gregory Peterson remarks 
that the cognitive science of religion is often taken to be an “inheritor of the 
feuerbachian project to reduce religion to something else, whether it be psy-
chology, class struggle, or will-to-power.”32 such projects have often seemed 
corrosive of religious belief; yet barth famously saw Ludwig feuerbach him-
self as an ally of theology, unmasking the pretensions of religion-as-merely-
human-project and driving theology back to the only ground on which it can 
properly stand.33
by the same token, the picture of ethics offered by greene, singer, and 
others is that our intuitive knowledge of good and evil has evolutionary origins 
as a way of enabling us to live in social relationships—to solve the problem of 
“Me vs. us,” as greene puts it. We might express this theologically, following 
bonhoeffer, by describing our moral intuitions as means by which we seek to 
live in the world out of our own resources (which we are compelled to do but 
cannot), means by which we try to overcome our alienation from one another. 
Yet evolutionary theorists often argue that the evolved morality that fosters in-
group cohesion also promotes out-group hostility. in greene’s terms, it helps 
solve the problem of “Me vs. us,” but at the expense of creating the problem 
of “us vs. them,” of “moral tribes.” in other words (in bonhoefferian terms), 
our efforts to overcome our alienation through our knowledge of good and evil 
merely replicate that alienation.
in short, barth and bonhoeffer are articulating a profound theological sus-
picion of ethics-as-human-project: the attempt to know about the good on the 
strength of our own resources of reason and insight. Let us allow that—not-
withstanding the questions raised earlier about aspects of their arguments—
greene and singer are broadly correct: what we take to be reasoned moral 
judgments are often rationalizations of intuitive prejudices that are contingent 
products of our evolutionary history. for a christian ethic informed by barth 
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and bonhoeffer, neuroethicists who show this are playing the valuable ground-
clearing role of “masters of suspicion,” unmasking the pretentions of a merely 
human project of ethics and driving theological ethics back to its proper sources 
and methods.
Theological Appropriation
as bonhoeffer makes plain, however, theological suspicion does not mean the 
wholesale rejection of ethics but its critical appropriation and reconstruction. 
the “knowledge of good and evil,” as we have seen, he associates with the fall 
and the curse that comes in its wake: fallen humanity cannot live out of its own 
resources yet is compelled to do so. “that,” remarks bonhoeffer in Creation and 
Fall, “is what death means” (135). and yet the curse itself contains concealed 
within it god’s compassion and promise: “the final and most terrible of curses 
that oppresses humankind is death, having to return to dust. Yet now death 
becomes for human beings, who live because they are preserved in compassion, 
a promise held out to them by the god of grace. . . . how should adam know 
that, in this promise of death, already the end of death, the resurrection of the 
dead, was being spoken of?” (135–36). the story does not end with the fall. 
even in telling of the fall, the narrative points ahead to god’s call and invita-
tion to humanity to be reconciled to god in Jesus christ.
in the fragment of Ethics quoted earlier, bonhoeffer takes up this theme, ex-
pounding what is meant by reconciliation against the backdrop of this account 
of the fall.34 he finds our fallen condition reflected in various aspects of our 
moral life and shows in turn how each of these is transformed by god’s recon-
ciling word and work. first, our fallen state is one of “disunion” and “double-
mindedness” (cf. Jas 1:8). We are self-conscious of our own doing of good and 
evil; we make ourselves into judges, “like god,” he says, “but with the difference 
that each judgment [we] pass falls on [ourselves]” (314). the more morally seri-
ous and admirable fallen human beings are, the more “their thoughts day and 
night are intensely focused on the unfathomable number of possible conflicts 
in order to think them through in advance, come to a decision, and determine 
their own choice” (310). god’s reconciling word to us is a liberating call away 
from this state to the true freedom of simplicity and single-mindedness. “the 
freedom of Jesus is not the arbitrary choice of one among countless possibilities. 
instead, it consists precisely in the complete simplicity of his action, for which 
there are never several possibilities, conflicts, or alternatives, but always only 
one. Jesus calls this one option the will of god. he calls it his food to do this 
will” (313; cf. Jn 4:34).
Likewise, “for those for whom the knowledge of good and evil has been 
overcome, there is no longer a choice among various possibilities but always 
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only the one option of being elected to do the one will of god in simplicity” 
(320). Jesus says, “do not judge, so that you may not be judged” (Mt 7:1), call-
ing us away from the knowledge of good and evil that makes us “essentially 
judges” (314). he says, “do not let your left hand know what your right hand 
is doing,” calling us away from the self-consciousness of our doing of good 
and evil—so that in the parable of the sheep and the goats (Mt 25:31–46), the 
righteous who have fed Jesus when he was hungry, clothed him when he was 
naked, and so forth “will not know their own goodness; Jesus will reveal it to 
them” (319).
it would be a great mistake, however, to imagine that our “[election] to do the 
one will of god in simplicity” puts an end to thought and reasoning. for those 
in whom the knowledge of good and evil has been overcome by christ, there is 
the christian task of discernment signaled by texts such as Paul’s injunction to 
“be transformed by the renewing of your minds, so that you may discern what 
is the will of god—what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Rom 12:2). for 
those who are set free from being “essentially judges,” there is instead “a judg-
ing that is a genuine human activity, that is, a ‘judging’ that springs from the 
accomplished unity with the origin, with Jesus christ” (316). in Paul’s words, 
“those who are spiritual judge [anakrinei] all things, and they are themselves 
judged by no one” (1 cor 2:15, translation adapted from nRsv). alongside 
Jesus’s saying “do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing,” 
there is Paul’s admonition, “examine yourselves to see whether you are living in 
the faith. test yourselves. do you not realize that Jesus christ is in you?” (2 cor 
13:5). in contrast to the kind of self-examination that “focus[es] on one’s own 
knowledge of good and evil and its realization in practical life,” says bonhoef-
fer, what Paul commends is a christian self-examination that “daily renews the 
knowledge that ‘Jesus christ is in us’” (325). this discernment of god’s will is 
a concrete task that must result in the actual doing of god’s will. it is also a daily 
task, to be undertaken anew in each new situation in which we find ourselves.
this may seem like the worst kind of voluntarism and situationism, but other 
fragments of the Ethics make it clear that god’s will is not to be understood in 
an arbitrary or situationist manner. nor is its discernment a task that bypasses 
human reason and reflection:
intellect, cognitive ability, and attentive perception of the context come into 
lively play here. all of this discerning will be encompassed and pervaded by 
the commandment. Prior experiences will raise encouraging or cautionary 
notes. under no circumstances must one count on or wait for unmediated 
inspirations, lest all too easily one fall prey to self-deception. . . . Possibilities 
and consequences will be considered carefully. in short, in order to discern 
what the will of god may be, the entire array of human abilities will be em-
ployed (323–24).
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so do the insights of neuroethicists discussed in the present essay have any part 
to play in the task of discerning god’s will so understood? it might appear not, 
because bonhoeffer in this discussion draws a sharp distinction between psy-
chological and theological perspectives. his account of freedom and simplicity, 
he says, would “be completely misunderstood if these things were taken to be 
psychologically observable facts” (319). because “psychological observation it-
self is always already subject to the law of disunion . . . [it will] never be able to 
discover the simplicity, the freedom, and the doing that Jesus intended” (320). 
We will not, then, learn from the psychological or cognitive sciences that the 
ethical task is to do the one will of god in simplicity and freedom, nor will those 
sciences tell us what that simplicity and freedom look like.
bonhoeffer’s tone appears rather dismissive of the psychological sci-
ences—perhaps more quickly dismissive than he should be, even by his own 
lights. he does, after all, go on to say that “the entire array of human abili-
ties” should be employed in the task of discernment (324). similarly, barth, 
who is every bit as insistent as bonhoeffer that scientific knowledge in itself 
cannot discover the reality of the human creature, nonetheless allows that 
within its own limits it can offer genuine insights.35 scientific and philo-
sophical accounts of the “phenomena of the human” are, he remarks, “like 
an interesting commentary on a text which must first be known and read for 
itself if the commentary is to be intelligible and useful.”36 a commentary 
can help us understand a text better, provided the commentator has taken 
the trouble to be faithful to the text. so if we know on theological grounds 
that the ethical task is to do the one will of god in simplicity and freedom, 
neuroethical commentary on the human “text” could in principle help us 
understand better what it means for concrete human lives to fulfill that 
task. to be sure, putative insights from the cognitive sciences are at best 
partial, fallible, and provisional, and they may be distorted by methodological 
weakness, ideological bias, or other kinds of flaw. so they must be critically 
appropriated into a theological ethic, with all due caution and keen aware-
ness of their limitations. nonetheless, the appropriate response is critical 
reception rather than outright rejection.
to understand how this might work in practice, we briefly revisit Joshua 
greene, who concludes his essay in neuroethics with “six rules for modern 
herders” (that is, for us who have to coexist not only with members of our 
own “moral tribe” but with other tribes whose commonsense moralities dif-
fer from ours).37 first, in our personal lives, moral instincts are more reliable 
guides than reasoning, which is susceptible to unconscious self-interested bias, 
but when faced with controversies in which the instincts of different moral 
tribes conflict, we must resort to reason. second, rights language (the principal 
deontological alternative to utilitarianism that greene considers) should be 
used sparingly and recognized for what it is: not a rationally defensible moral 
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theory but a rhetorical weapon for use when moral reasoning is exhausted or 
inopportune. third, in moral controversy, we should focus on the facts, on em-
pirical evidence about what does or does not work. fourth, we should beware 
the unconscious tendency to select whichever version of “fairness” suits our 
own interests. fifth, to settle moral controversies, we should use the “common 
currency” of utilitarian reasoning. and finally, we (the implied audience seems 
to be more or less affluent Westerners) should give to charity because this can 
make a dramatic difference to the well-being of others and partially overcome 
our instinctive indifference to strangers.
the theological account developed here might respond to greene’s six 
practical suggestions along the following lines. given its critique of human 
aspirations to the knowledge of good and evil, this theological perspective will 
share greene’s suspicion of rights language and other deontological approaches 
insofar as these are seen as attempts to provide a universal, rationally defen-
sible basis for moral norms. this is not to say that such moral language should 
be rejected wholesale; indeed, in another fragment of the Ethics, bonhoeffer 
develops an account of natural rights, but it is his theological understanding 
of the natural that enables his rights-talk to be far more than mere rhetorical 
weaponry.38 this bonhoefferian perspective will also share greene’s concerns 
about biased fairness—our tendency to spin our moral principles to our own 
advantage—and the tendency for our moral reasoning to be deployed in self-
interested and self-deceiving ways.
indeed, in some respects this theological approach will both intensify and 
extend the range of greene’s suspicion. in particular, a theologically motivated 
suspicion of ethics will extend to greene’s own moral reasoning and the status 
of “metamorality” that he claims for utilitarianism. he fails to acknowledge 
that utilitarianism also depends on a particular set of presuppositions about 
the human good, emerging from a particular intellectual and cultural context. 
therefore, promoting it as a metamorality looks more like a land-grab by one 
moral tribe than a tribe-neutral way of enabling everyone to coexist on the 
new pastures.
if greene’s claims for utilitarianism are rejected, his third rule about fo-
cusing on the facts also requires severe qualification. it has an appearance of 
objectivity, of taking moral controversies out of the realm of unprovable theory 
into the domain of hard empirical evidence. in reality, though, greene’s unac-
knowledged and contestable presuppositions about the human good generate 
questionable claims about what the relevant facts are.39 the bonhoefferian 
account developed in this essay will not, of course, dismiss empirical evidence: 
according to bonhoeffer, the discernment of god’s will calls for attention to 
past experience, “attentive perception of the context,” and consideration of the 
likely consequences of one’s decisions, among other things.40 We shall, how-
ever, need to be very clear about the limits of what empirical evidence can tell 
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us. on some questions it might form a significant part of the argument, but on 
others its role would be more limited. for example, debates about legalizing 
assisted suicide or euthanasia are far from being settled by empirical evidence 
of the effects of legislation in oregon or the netherlands, even though such 
evidence is not irrelevant.
greene’s claims for utilitarianism as a metamorality have already been 
contested; more generally, a theologically motivated suspicion of the human 
project of ethics should make us skeptical of any quest for a metamorality, an 
overview that would enable us to settle the controversies between contrasting 
moral visions. a more promising response to moral controversy can be found 
in something like nigel biggar’s conversational approach.41 conversation 
does not require an allegedly neutral metamorality or a universal procedure 
for translating between the languages of different moral tribes, only a commit-
ment by the parties to speak and listen to one another and to make a serious 
effort to understand each other’s perspectives. it need not have grand aims 
but can be directed toward the modest goal of reaching limited agreement on 
particular questions.
Last, this theological account will of course endorse greene’s final precept, 
to give charitably as a way of partially overcoming the inbuilt weakness of our 
sympathy with distant strangers. it will, however, press greene’s point further, 
calling for more demanding practices of hospitality to strangers and solidarity 
with those who are poor and marginalized, wherever in the world those neigh-
bors of ours might be.
Conclusion
among its many conversation partners, there is every reason for theological 
ethics to attend carefully and critically to the kind of cognitive scientific study 
of morality discussed in this essay. it is essential that our attention be critical 
because the difficulties noted earlier with the conceptual framing, design, and 
interpretation of studies such as greene’s mean the conclusions he and his 
colleagues draw are by no means beyond question. but attention that is also 
careful and receptive could pay dividends because greene and his colleagues—
like feuerbach and the other “masters of suspicion” before them—may prove 
friends in disguise to theological ethics. greene’s critical perspective on what 
he calls our “point-and-shoot” moralities, and on the theoretical rationaliza-
tions we construct for them, is a timely reminder to theologians to have a 
properly theologically critical view of the human project of ethics. on this, as on 
other topics, the cognitive sciences can offer helpful commentary that (if used 
judiciously) may be of real value to serious theological readers of the “text” of 
human creaturely being.
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